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DICTA

The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied
BY GEORGE T. EVANS*

Any examination of the doctrine of stare decisis is, inherently, a
study of judicial precedents. This is so because the doctrine itself is that
a distinct and solemn decision by a court or judge, made on a question
of law necessarily arising in a case is, to a high degree, binding authority
in subsequent cases in the same court, or in courts of equal or inferior
rank, when the "very point'

is presented for decision.

And when it is

said that the "decision" is binding, of course, it is the ratio decidendi,
or the principle, or the rule of law to be gathered from it, that is intended.
Where should the study of the doctrine of stare decisis begin? England at once suggests itself, because the importance of judicial precedents
has always been a distinguishing characteristic of English law. The unwritten or common law of England is, admittedly, only the accumulation of decided casem, going back in a series of reports from the present
day to and including the Year Books (1290-1535), in an almost continuous stream.
What other systems of law should be examined in this study of the
binding authority of precedent, this investigation of the development of
the doctrine of stare decisis? Not the Roman law, nor any of the modern
systems founded upon it, because, as is common knowledge, none of
these give any greater weight to judicial precedent than to other expressions of expert legal opinion. In those systems reports and text-books
are of equal significance. Both evidence the law and are, therefore, of
the same persuasive effect upon judge or court. Not so in England, however. An English precedent speaks with authority and is ordinarily to
be obeyed.
"We have been taught for ages that the glory of the common
law is the fact that it is built precedent upon precedent, like the
coral reefs, or a brick house, and that the common law, unlike the
Roman law, follows precedent rather than the writings of jurists."2
The English common law is often spoken of as "customary law."
But it would seem that such a description hardly fits the character of the
common law in England. There custom is not inevitably law and a
judicial precedent is not always mere evidence of the law. Sometimes it
is the law. A custom in England has no legal effect until it has been
found and declared by a court or judge, after which it is the decision
*Of the Denver bar.
Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat 257. 290.
'H. W. Humble, 19 Mich. L. R., 608, 612, 614.
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DICTA
and not the custom that is the law. Thus, in England, a judicial decision
may actually create law, as where the judge or court finds and declares a
custom. Or an English judge or court may decide a case by virtue of a
custom which has, in a previous decision, been found and declared. In
the latter situation no law is created. The law of the older decision is
simply declared. Where a custom is found and originally declared by a
judge or court, the decision is law for the future. But where a prior
decision is merely applied by a judge or court in a given case, it is the
law of that case because it has been the law of the land since custom was
first transmuted into law by judicial determination and declaration.
Hence the importance and authority of judicial precedent, characteristic
of the law in England, as distinguished from the law in those countries
following the Roman law or civil code systems.
Upon what reason may be put the acceptance of mere judicial decisions in England, as sanctified statements of the law of the land? Why
is precedent so authoritative there? Entirely apart frorfi the universal
recognition by all mankind of the obvious advantages of permanency,
continuity and consistency, in similar circumstances of life, the answer
seems to be that the English royal judges have been, since ancient times,
a relatively small and compact body of legal experts, men of high professional standing, working together in harmony (in the larger sense of
the word) in the administration of justice in the royal courts, with such
skill and power as to engender at once the respect and acquiescence of the
people and the bar. Whenever it has been necessary for them to "fill in"
by decision a vacant space in the common law of England, their work
has been obediently accepted.
Before dusting off the ancient books and delving into the history of
stare decisis, another observation seems necessary as background. Judicial precedents and writing or printing are combined indissolubly. To
constitute a judicial precedent a decision must be susceptible of exhibition
and study. If it cannot be produced and examined it cannot be followed,
it can have no influence on the future action of judges and courts within
the contemplation of the doctrine expressed by the words stare decisis.
We turn, then, to the first attempts at reporting judicial decisions in the
English system. We go to the Year Books.
As a source of actual information on the development of the doctrine of stare decisis the Year Books are. disappointing. In his History
of JudicialPrecedent 3 T. Ellis Lewis shows that the Year Books do not
approach the modern concept of a series of reported decisions, but, on
the contrary, consist of notes made by students and practitioners of the
law concerning what they heard, observed and considered important
while in court; that names of litigants are often omitted; that, while
'Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 46, p. 207 and p. 341.
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account was taken of the facts and the points of law, nevertheless the
note-takers were more concerned with the debates, practice and procedure
than with the substantive law; that the judgment of the court was sometimes not written down; and that, altogether, it seems apparent that the
"reporters" did not intend that what they wrote should furnish any
guiding principles for posterity. But whatever their defects as a collection of reported decisions and however they may, themselves, fail to deal
with the authority of precedent and the development of the doctrine of
stare decisis, one item of importance is disclosed by our glance at the
Year Books. It is this: the very fact that the Year Books were compiled
at all indicates that the profession, even in those early times, recognized
the need of a record of the disposition of matters in the past, upon which
might be based action in the future, albeit the record was only personal
memoranda for the personal information of the man who took it down.
In view of the foregoing brief resume of the history of the attempt
at reporting judicial decisions in England during the period of the Year
Books, it seems safe to conclude that the rule of stare decisis had not
developed to a point where the term "doctrine" could in any proper
sense be applied to it during that time. However, we are certainly erititled to assume that where, despite the handicaps of the method then
currently followed for the preservation of decisions, a prior judgment
could, in some manner, be sufficiently proved to a judge or to a court in
a later case, where the question was the same, the innate common sense
of the later judges would prevent the flouting of the determination of
their predecessors. To that limited extent only may we say that the
doctrine of stare decrsis began to take shape before the advent of a reliable and accurate system of law reporting.
Professor Holdsworth tells us 4 that Sir John Burrow published in
1765 the first authorized series of decisions of particular courts in England, which approximated the modern standard. During the period
from the last of the Year Books down to Burrow's reports there were
published many so-called reports, but they were unauthorized and were
much like those in the Year Books-they were mere reproductions of
notes taken down for the private instruction of the writer. There was
one important improvement, however-written pleadings were coming
into use and thus the issues were clearly formed
and the decision on the
5
issue caught the attention of the note-takers.
Sir John Burrow's authorized reports, first published in 1765, undoubtedly put the judges of England in position to develop the doctrine
of stare decisis. The "mechanical" means to that end were then definitely
at hand. But we cannot fix 1765 as the starting point of the doctrine
'History of English Law, Vol. V, pp. 355-378.
5

1bid. 371.
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of stare decisis, for to do so would be to overlook perhaps its strongest
advocate, whose labors greatly facilitated its application, Sir Edward
Coke, who died in 1634. Coke's premise was that, "Out of the old
fields must spring the new corn,"6 and much of his writing is devoted to
deducing rules from the ancient authorities, explaining and reconciling
conflicting decisions and showing that the principles upon which the old
cases had been decided could be applied in his day and time. By thus
collecting, classifying and reconciling the old cases from the Year Books
and from the books of unofficial "reporters" who preceded him, Coke
put into the hands of the lawyers of that day an array of precedent,
which they were only too glad to cite as authorities in their own cases.
And out of this citing and following there dodbtless came into full life
the doctrine that we now call stare decisis. Of Coke and his work in this
behalf, Bacon said:
"Had it not been for Edward Coke's Reports, the law by this
time had almost been like a ship without ballast; for that the cases
of modern experience are fled from those that are adjudged and
7
ruled in former times."
Not overlooking such men as Burrow, Plowden, Byer, Yelverton,
Style, Rolles, Vaughn and many others who worked in this field, I
submit that Sir Edward Coke was the father of the doctrine of stare
decisis as it is known today.
In thus tracing the development of the instrumentation of the doctrine of stare decisis in England, we find that the necessity for adherence
to judicial precedent emerges again and again. It seems to have been
recognized from the very beginning of adjudicated cases in England
that the reasonable expectations of men, built upon the distinct and
solemn pronouncement of a judge or court should not be demolished at
the whim of any successor; and, that to permit such practice would ultimately cause law to lose its significance as a rule of conduct, making a
litigant's adventure in court akin to a journey into a wilderness of confusion. The constant and consistent effort at better reporting of decided
cases is strong evidence of the determination of the profession in England
to avoid such a situation.
Such was the "ancestry" of the doctrine of stare decisis, which by
Blackstone's time (1723-1780) was certainly fully fledged. Concerning
it he said:
"For it is an established rule to abide former precedents, where
the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion; as also the law in that case being solemnly de'1 Co. Rep. (Pref.).
'Spedding, Letters and Life of Bacon, Vol. VI, p. 65.
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clared and determined, what was before uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to
his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce new law but to
expound the old. * * *
"The doctrine of the law then is this: That precedents and
rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though
their reason be not obvious at first view, we owe such deference to
former times as not to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration. * * *"8'
What of the development of the doctrine of stare decisis in the
United States? The plain answer seems to be that it came to these
shores fully developed with the colonists. Certainly it did not develop
here. And, as we have seen, it was in full operation in England before
the government of the United States was organized. It is simply one of
our many heritages from England.
To what extent should the doctrine of stare decisis be applied?
For an answer to this question we must leave the comfortable realm
of history and venture into the uncertain and boggy domain of theory
and speculation. And since, if this discussion is to have any practical
significance, it should deal chiefly with the application of the doctrine in
the United States, we will also quit England and come to this country.
These new theatres of operation do not, however, change the meaning
of the term stare decisis. As noted above, the doctrine may still be stated
to be that a distinct and solemn decision of a court or judge, made on a
question of law necessarily arising in a case, is, to a high degree, binding
authority in subsequent cases in the same court, or in courts of equal or
inferior rank, when the "very point" is presented for decision. In other
words, it is the teaching of the doctrine that the principle, or ratio
decedendi, of the prior decision is, ordinarily controlling on the same
point in later cases. Thus we are again inextricably involved with judicial precedents and, consequently, led irresistibly to a study thereof;
not, however, to learn of their history, as in the beginning, but to determine their authority.
Judicial precedents, when considered in relation to the doctrine of
stare decisis, seem to fall naturally into three classifications as follows:
(a) persuasive; (b) conditionally controlling; and, (c) absolutely controlling.
(a) Persuasive precedents: This classification may be exemplified
by decisions of courts of foreign countries and decisions of courts of one
'Cooley's Blackstone, 4 ed., Vol. I, pp. 70-71.

DICTA
state cited to courts in another state. Whether or not such decisions may
be said to come within the doctrine of stare decisis at all is, perhaps,
debatable. But, however that may be, it would seem that this group of
precedents may be dismissed here, with the observation that they should
be accorded only such authority as they merit, considering the courts
from whence they came, their appeal to reason, their age and the extent
to which they may have been relied upon, in dealings between man and
man, in the jurisdiction in which it is urged that they should be applied.
(b) Conditionally controlling precedents: This class differs from
persuasive precedents in that it does not include foreign decisions, nor
decisions from outside the jurisdiction where cited. Within it are what
might be called defective, junior, absolute precedents. Such are decisions
which, in the opinion of the court or judge to which they are cited, have
something wrong with them in reason, in law, or in both; and which,
coincidentally, have not by the passage of time and by their acceptance
and use by men, become so sanctified as to make adherence to them of
paramount importance. Thus a conditionally controlling precedent is a
decision which would be an absolutely controlling precedent, if it were
held to be sound enough, old enough and used enough at the time it is
under consideration. It might even be held absolutely controlling because of its age and use, although its soundness were doubted, if it had
become the basis of transactions in property, or contracts had been made
in reliance upon it. The interplay of the doctrine of stare decisis and
conditionally controlling precedents may, perhaps, be sufficiently illustrated by the following excerpt from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
for the majority of the Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case, where it
was said:
"We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social
policy. It represents an element of continuity in the law and is
rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations.
But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision * * * when such adherence
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope,
intrinsically sounder and verified by experience. * I *
"Our problem is, then, not one of rejecting a settled statutory
construction. The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail
over its later misapplication,'"
I submit that the assignment of a precedent to this classification,
thus making the doctrine of stare decisis inoperative, is a most dangerous
proceeding and that such action should be taken by a court or judge only
after the most prayerful study, so highly desirable, indeed so imperative,
is stability in the law. It was Blackstone who said:
'Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U. S. 119, 122; 84 L. ed. 604.
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"And it hath been an ancient observation in the laws of England, that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason
ptrhaps could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly
broken in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the
rule hath in the end appeared from inconveniences that followed
innovation."0
(c) Absolutely controlling precedents: These precedents are the
very warp and woof of the doctrine of stare decisis. This is the class of
precedents that has become the basis of the ownership of property and
rights to property, upon the faith of which contracts have been made
and which, generally, may be said to have been relied upon in their dealings by me.n to such an extent and for so long a time that they are binding despite the contrary opinion of any subsequent court or judge. Their
effect is to deprive a subsequent court or judge of judicial discretion.
They are in the fullest sense binding. Within this class are decisions of
the highest court of a jurisdiction, as controlling in those courts of lesser
rank in the same jurisdiction; decisions of the highest court of a state on
a question of local law, concluding the Supreme Court on such a question; and, last but by no means of least importance, the prior decisions
of the highest court of any jurisdiction as binding on itself, in later cases
involving the "very point." It is this class of precedents that makes it
possible for men to "know" the law and to enter upon new adventures,
involving accumulations of capital (whether large or small), secure in
the knowledge that their plans will not be set awry by some later court
decision; that gives substance to the opportunity for the growth and
expansion of undertakings, where men follow a line of conduct marked
in advance by stabilized law; that, in short, culminates in business, employment, progress, prosperity and the ultimate good of the people and
the security of the nation. It is the very foundation of a government
which may be said to be one of laws and not a government of men. In
the field of constitutional law it is especially important, because there it
encourages and protects the weak, encourages and restrains the strong,
and circumvents the despot.
Concerning this type of precedent and its application in the field of
constitutional law, Mr. Justice White (later Mr. Chief Justice White)
said in a dissenting opinion:
"The rights of every individual are guaranteed by the safeguards which have been thrown around them by our adjudications.
If these are to be assailed and overthrown * * * the rights of property, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, are of little
worth. * * * The fundamental conception of a judicial body is
that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the
"°Cooley's Blackstone, 4 ed., Vol. I, p. 70.
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Court, without regard to the personality of its members. Break
down this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that on
great constitutional questions this Court is to depart from the
settled conclusions of its predecessors and to determine them according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench
and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and
become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of
the people.""'
Perhaps no better statement of the importance of the doctrine of
stare decisis and the necessity for standing by absolute precedents, especially when the Constitution is involved, will ever be made.
On the general proposition of reverence for absolutely controlling
precedents, or, in other words, on the operation of the doctrine of stare
decisis, an early-day judge of a state court said:
"if the law, well established, may be annulled by an opinion,
a foundation is laid for the most reckless instability. The decisions
of one court may be overruled by another court, and those of the
latter will have only a transient efficacy, until some future court,
dissatisfied with them, shall substitute new principles in their place.
No system of inflexible adherence to established law can be as pernicious as such ceaseless and interminable fluctuations. -12
In conclusion, one more observation seems justified. It is this:
sometimes it is claimed that law is but the crystallization of social and
economic imperatives. This seems to be but another way of saying that
all law-that declared by the courts as well as statutory law passed by
the legislatures, state and national-is constantly in a state of flux, pulsating in rhythm to the impacts of supposedly irresistible social and economic forces. Such a view takes no account of the doctrine of stare decisis-the rule to the effect that courts and judges must be consistent;
that it is better that the law be established and certain than that it be
always undergoing a process of alteration in an attempt to do perfect
justice between all men at all times in conformity with social and economic trends currently discernible. Those holding the "social and
economic imperative" theory would cut the pattern to fit the cloth.
Those who hold with the doctrine of stare decisis would make the cloth
fit the pattern. These opposed philosophies seem to constitute the upper
and nether millstones of the judicial process in the United States, between which the courts must grind out a reasonable, fair and workable
system of law.
I submit, however, that, situated as we now are, in the midst of
social and economic conditions which can be nothing more than tempo'Pollock v. Farmers' L. El T. Co. (1895), 157 U. S. 427, 651, 652; 39 L.
ed. 759..
"'-osmer, C. J., in Palmer's Admr. v. Mead (1828), 7 Conn. 149, 157, 158.
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rary, and, faced as we now are with the uncertain and turbulent sea of
social and economic possibilities upon which we must embark in the
post-war era, we dare not cast away the ancient anchor of the law; we
must not abandon the doctrine of stare decisis; but, on the contrary, it
must be vigorously applied.

Help Wanted-Male or Female
Wanted-100 men and women to serve in state legislature. Must
be at least twenty-five years of age, citizens of the United States and the
State of Colorado. Must be honest, discrete, intelligent, able and personable. Must 'be well acquainted with all professions, businesses, industries and employments in the State of Colorado, including stock
raising, farming, mining, manufacturing, selling, financing, transportation and utilities. Must be intimately acquainted with all phases of
state government, departmental and institutional administration, personnel problems, the levying and collecting of revenue, economical and
efficient budgeting, public welfare, public health, education, the regulation of industry, the regulation of utilities, liquor, game and fish, highway safety, the commitment, care, treatment and restoration of dependent children, delinquent children, criminals, and the insane and feeble
minded, the preservation of natural resources, the construction and maintenance of highways and public buildings, and any other matter which
is or may become a proper subject for state legislation. Must have a
comprehensive knowledge of the laws of Colorado, including the Constitution, three volumes of statutes, eleven volumes of session laws, one
hundred and thirteen volumes of decisions of the supreme court, the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the common law of England as applied in Colorado and numerous published and unpublished
volumes of rules and regulations of various departments, boards, bureas
and directors. Should know the rules of interpreting and construing
statutes and should be able to perceive instantaneously the ultimate effect
of all words used in any proposed bill or amendment thereto. Should
know legislative procedure, administrative procedure and judicial procedure. Should know the problems of law enforcement. The term of
service is two or four years. Meetings are held in Denver once every two
years for from 90 to 150 days, and during this period must be prepared
to spend entire time in Denver and devote entire efforts to the responsibilities of position. During the remainder of term will be subject to call
at any time for any period of time. Will be selected by from 10,000 to
150,000 electors and before obtaining position must be prepared to interview these persons in groups of from 1 to 500 during the six weeks
period prior to selection. Must be willing to consult with any elector at
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any time on any question, public or private. Must be ready and willing
to answer questionnaires or all conceivable subjects, whether or not
related to state legislation, from any group now in existence or hereafter
created. Will be subjected to criticism whether justified or unjustified and
whether based upon fact, intelligent appraisal, or arising from prejudice
or incomplete understanding of the facts. Will be expected to anticipate
all problems which might arise in the future and find means of accomplishing the impossible, and overcoming conditions without the power
or facilities to do so. Will be expected to increase the service rendered
and yet reduce the cost to each individual contributing thereto. When in
session will be paid expenses in coming to Denver and returning home
once; however, during the session and at other times, will be expected
to make several trips between home and Denver at own expense. While
in Denver, will be expected to pay own living expenses. Will be subjected to some expense in seeking the position whether or not ultimately
successful in obtaining it. THE COMPENSATION REGARDLESS
OF TIME SPENT AND REGARDLESS OF EXPENSES INCURRED IS $1,000.00 FOR THE TWO YEAR TERM. Out of this
amount will be paid living expenses in Denver, traveling expenses for
trips to Denver in excess of one each session, and amounts spent in seeking the position. In computing income tax, the living and traveling
expenses, but not the expenses of seeking the position, are deductible. If
you are interested in such a position apply to the chairman of the County
Central Committee of your political party.
Denver Has Woman Bailiff
The Denver district judges have appointed Mrs. Bessie Bergman as
permanent bailiff of the criminal division of the district court. Mrs.
Bergman will also have duties as deputy clerk of the court. The creation
of the position of women's bailiff was made necessary by the recent
advent of women jurors in Denver courts.
District Attorneys Hold Annual Meeting
At the annual meeting of the District Attorneys' Association, held
in Denver in January, the following officers were elected:
President, Hatfield Chilson, Lqveland
Vice-President, Irl Foard, Colorado Springs
Secretary-Treasurer, Sam Nikkel, Cripple Creek
Retiring president is A. Allen Brown of Delta and the retiring
vice-president is Sidney Pleasant of Craig. The secretary-treasurer was
re-elected. The meeting was held in the Supreme Court chambers. Judge
Mortimer Stone, of the Supreme Court, spoke of the task of reconversion from the standpoint of the district attorney. Frank C. Dillon, Denver probation officer, spoke on the problems of probation.
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County Judges Hold Annual Meeting
At the annual meeting of the County Judges' Association, held in
Denver in January, the following officers were elected:
President, A. W. Dulweber, Fort Morgan
Vice-President, Christian D. Stoner, Golden
Secretary-Treasurer, C. M. Somerville, Hugo
Discussions were had of the problems of juvenile delinquency and
retirement compensation for judges. Committees were appointed to consider these matters and present to the legislature bills for greater penalties for parents whose children are delinquent and for a retirement compensation system for county judges. Judge William E. Buck, Boulder,
is retiring president.
Admitted to a Higher Court
Lionel Fisher, prominent Fort Morgan attorney,
heart attack in a Denver hotel. Mr. Fisher was city
Morgan, and deputy district attorney. He was active
matters. He was 44 years of age and is survived by a

died recently of a
attorney for Fort
in bar association
widow and child.

Upon Information and Belief
The newspapers contain lots of interesting information. The Association of District Judges of Nebraska have adopted standardized instructions to juries. This sounds like something that might have merit.
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of Newark, N. J., former president of the
American Bar Association, dean of the New York University Law
School, one of the outstanding lawyers of the nation in the field of improvement of judicial administration, has called upon the colleges to
train men and women for political leadership. We certainly need something of this kind.
The New York State Bar Association has appointed a former newspaper man to handle public relations work for it. The bar's poorest
relations are its public relations.
The Wisconsin State Bar Association's board of governors has instructed its committees on integration and organization to draft a proposed set of rules for an all-inclusive, self-governing bar organization
and to submit the proposal to the board at its next meeting. In 1943 the
legislature provided for integration of the bar, but action was deferred
during the war.
A British court has had to determine which of two persons killed
in a bomb blast survived. This problem no lInger exists in Colorado by
reason of the Simultaneous Death Act passed in 1943.

